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International Water Cooperation and Environmental Peacemaking 
 
Abstract: 
Proponents of the environmental peacemaking approach argue that environmental cooperation 
has the potential to improve relations between states. This is the case because such cooperation 
facilitates common problem solving, cultivates interdependence, and helps to build trust and 
understanding. But as of yet, very few cross-case studies on environmental peacemaking exist. 
Further, much of the available literature understands peace in negative terms as the mere absence 
of acute conflict. This paper addresses both shortcomings by studying the impact of 
international water cooperation on transitions towards more peaceful interstate relations. In 
order to do so, we combine information on positive water-related interactions between states 
with the peace scale, a recent dataset measuring the degree of positive and negative peace 
between states. For the period 1956-2006, we find that a higher number of positive, water-
related interactions in the previous ten years makes a shift towards more peaceful interstate 
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Introduction 
Shortly after they gained independence in the first half of the 19th century, El Salvador and 
Honduras became involved in an intense, long-lasting conflict which involved several militarized 
disputes. The main reason for this conflict were disagreements about territory along their shared 
border and about some islands in the Golf of Fonseca (Thompson and Dreyer 2010: 140-141). 
During the 1980s, both states intensified cooperation on environmental issues, among others to 
preserve transboundary water resources. Notable expressions of these efforts were the Trifinio 
Plan (1986) and the Central American Commission for Environment and Development (1989). 
These cooperation efforts facilitated interactions and joint problem solving between high-
ranking policy makers and citizen from both countries. During the 1990s, the conflict de-
escalated significantly (King et al. 2016; López 2004). Consequentially, analysts have argued that 
water and environmental cooperation between both states ‘acted as a catalyst for further 
cooperation’ (Carius 2006: 13). Similarly, scholars have attributed a peacemaking effect to secret 
water negotiations between Israel and Jordan, to the Orange-Senqu River Commission 
(ORASECOM) between Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa, and to the water regime 
governing the Okavango (Abukhater 2013; Turton 2003). 
Cases like these suggest that international environmental cooperation might not only tackles 
environmental problems and facilitates sustainable development, but could also yield a peace 
dividend. This claim has been picked up by the literature on environmental peacemaking, which 
investigates whether environmental cooperation ‘can be an […] effective catalyst for reducing 
tensions, broadening cooperation, fostering demilitarization, and promoting peace’ (Conca 2001: 
226). In this study, ‘environmental peacemaking refers to all forms of cooperation on 
environmental issues […] which […] achieve creating less violent and more peaceful relations’ 
between states (Ide 2018b: 3). It is part of a broader effort ― usually termed environmental 
peacebuilding ― ‘of governing and managing natural resources and the environment to support 
durable peace’ (UNEP 2018). 
So far, limited consensual knowledge on environmental peacemaking between states exists (Ide 
2018b). Case studies from South America (Kakabadse et al. 2016), East Africa (Martin et al. 
2011), the Middle East (Ide 2017) or Cyprus (Zikos et al. 2015) find that cooperation on water 
and biodiversity have contributed to the improvement of tense interstate relations. But other 
scholars, often focusing on the same cases, find little effect of environmental cooperation on 
wider interstate relations (Akçalı and Antonsich 2009; Barquet 2015; Colakhodži et al. 2014; 
Reynolds 2017). Some even argue that such cooperation depoliticizes conflicts and gives rise to 
new tensions (Aggestam and Sundell 2016; Büscher and Schoon 2009). 
We recognise two shortcomings of this literature. First, available research on environmental 
peacemaking pays little attention to positive peace. In recent years, the dominant conception of 
peace as the absence of violence (negative peace) has been criticized in international relations 
(Diehl 2016), political geography (Williams and McConnell 2011), and peace and conflict studies 
(Gleditsch et al. 2014). Such a focus on negative peace restrains our knowledge on transitions 
from the mere absence of violence towards more positive forms of interactions (such as 
economic integration or security community). In a foundational text on environmental 
peacemaking, Conca (2002: 9) defines peace as ‘a continuum ranging from the absence of violent 
conflict to the inconceivability of violent conflict.’ However, almost all scholars doing research in 
this tradition either focus explicitly on the absence of violence (Barquet et al. 2014) or study 
cases of very tense international relations in which the avoidance of physical violence is an 
immediate concern, such as the Korean Peninsula (Mjelde et al. 2017), Peru-Ecuador until 1998 
(Ali 2007) and Israel-Palestine (Reynolds 2017). 
The second shortcoming of the current environmental peacemaking literature is that most 
available publications draw evidence from either one or very few cases, while there is a notable 
lack of cross-case investigations. We agree with Krampe (2017: 8) that the dominant case-study 
approach provides ‘a good basis, but […] constrains comparison’ and generalisation as it is often 
based on rather different definitions and operationalisations of key variables (for instance, of 
environmental cooperation and peace). Recently, a few large-N studies on the issue have been 
published, but these focus solely on the avoidance of violent conflict (Dinar et al. 2015; Mitchell 
and Zawahri 2015) or utilise data on environmental treaties (Barquet et al. 2014; Ide 2018a), 
which might be weak proxies for actual environmental cooperation (see next section). 
This article addresses both shortcomings ― the lack of cross-case studies and the dominant 
focus on negative peace ― in the environmental peacemaking literature. In order to do so, we 
focus on water-related cooperation in the face of environmental stress for three reasons. First, 
the existing literature largely agrees that water cooperation is the form of environmental 
cooperation most likely to yield a peace dividend, among others due to its cross-border nature as 
well as its economic and political relevance in many regions (Brochmann and Hensel 2009; Feil 
et al. 2009). Second, there is an extensive literature on water cooperation and conflict, which 
allows for a better specification of our theoretical expectations. Third, and relatedly, sufficient 
data on water interaction is available to test our theoretical propositions (Link et al. 2016; 
Petersen-Perlman et al. 2017). 
More specifically, this article investigates the impact of water cooperation on transitions towards 
more peaceful relations between states for the period 1956-2006. In order to do so, data on 
positive, water-related interactions are combined with the peace scale recently developed by 
Goertz and colleagues (2016). We find that a higher number of positive, water-related 
interactions during the previous ten years increases the likelihood of a transition towards more 
peaceful relations between two states. This is especially so if these states are not in acute conflict 
with each other. 
The remainder of this article introduces our theoretical framework and hypotheses, and explains 
the data and methods used. Afterwards, the results are presented and discussed, before a 
conclusion is drawn. 
 
Theoretical Background: Water Cooperation and Peacemaking 
The literature on environmental peacemaking identifies two broad mechanisms through which 
water cooperation can facilitate the improvement of interstate relations (Conca 2001; Ide 2018b; 
Lejano 2006).  
The first mechanism is rooted in liberal and functionalist theories of international politics. 
Liberal approaches have long claimed that highly interdependent states face little incentives to 
fight each other (Oneal and Russett 1999), but tend to cooperate in order to address shared 
problems and realise common gains (Keohane and Nye 2001). This should apply to 
environmental interdependence as well, for instance when rivers are shared or water pollution 
crosses political boundaries (Dinar 2009). In a functionalist logic, such cooperation is likely to 
spill over, that is, it ‘will set in motion economic, social and political progresses which generate 
pressures towards further integration’ (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991: 4), hence creating a virtuous 
cycle. As the case of the Syrian-Turkish dam on the Orontes River shows, cooperation on flood 
management is well able to catalyse further joint action on hydro-energy and the management of 
other watersheds (Scheumann and Shamaly 2016). Increased interdependence and cooperation, 
in turn, discourage the use of violence and facilitate the creation of a transnational community. 
The second mechanism draws from constructivist theory and sociological institutionalism. 
According to Adler (1997: 254), citizens and policy makers tend to ‘institutionalize 
commonalities running through the whole region, including shared perceptions of external 
threats.’ Water-related problems are often perceived as severe, shared, and external threats 
(Conca 2002). Statements by key decision makers announcing the need or actual plans for water 
cooperation send signals to broader publics that better relations between the respective states are 
desired and possible (Sadoff and Grey 2002). Furthermore, once water cooperation is 
established, it increases interactions between decision makers and civil society actors (Ovodenko 
2014). Such interactions can, in turn, stimulate the building of trust and understanding. This is 
based on the assumption that people ‘develop perceptions of interest and understandings of 
desirable behavior from social interactions with others’ (Finnemore 1996: 128). Water-related 
cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian communities, for instance, has been argued to give 
rise to more peace-prone discourses in the participating groups (Ide 2017). 
In practice, these two mechanisms are usually deeply entangled and even reinforcing. The trust 
and understanding built during initial cooperation in the context of the Central American 
Commission for Environment and Development, for instance, laid the basis for further water 
cooperation between El Salvador and Honduras in the late 1980s, which in turn facilitated the 
peace process (King et al. 2016). Similarly, a spill-over of water cooperation under ORASECOM 
increased the number of interactions and institutions through which trust building in southern 
Africa could take place (Turton 2003).  
One can hence hypothesise that water cooperation facilitates more peaceful relations between 
states through the building of trust and understanding and by increasing interdependence. 
However, this begs the question of how to define and identify water cooperation, especially 
across a larger number of cases. Many existing studies on environmental peacemaking (Barquet 
et al. 2014; Ide 2018a) and international water interactions (Bernauer and Siegfried 2008; 
Ovodenko 2014) use formal treaties as indicators of cooperation.  
But international water treaties might be very shallow, and even if they are well-designed, follow-
up interaction facilitating trust building and a spill-over of cooperation is not guaranteed. In the 
worst case, environmental agreements even mask and reify severe conflicts (Zeitoun and 
Mirumachi 2008). The water accords concluded between Israel and Palestine in 1995 as articles 
of the Oslo II agreement, for instance, established a joint water committee (JWC). But the 
accords can hardly be termed cooperative given the continued strong tensions and grievances 
(especially on the Palestinian side), while no JWC meetings were held between 2010 and 2016 
and little if any spill-over effects occurred (Selby 2013). 
Hence, the kind of water cooperation which can stimulate environmental peacemaking processes 
is unlikely to be indicated by treaties alone. Neither are formal agreements necessary for 
environmental peacemaking. Rather, we propose that continuous and positive (i.e. non-hostile) 
water-related interactions between two or more states indicate the kind of water cooperation 
relevant for environmental peacebuilding. Such interactions include the formation of water 
treaties, but also meetings of policy makers or ministerial staff, various forms of cultural, 
scientific and economic cooperation, and public statements by state officials (Wolf et al. 2003). 
These interactions indicate (i) the spill-over (or at least continuation) of existing cooperation as 
well as (ii) the existence of forums and meetings where (and public statements through which) 
trust and understanding can be built (Ho 2017; Petersen-Perlman et al. 2017).  
However, such interactions should be rather recent. Positive interactions that took place a long 
time ago are likely to be no longer part of the institutional memory of the state, while the 
involved technical experts may have retired and the broader public is concerned about more 
recent developments. Given that processes of spill-over and trust building still take some time 
(López 2004; Martin et al. 2011), we propose to categorise all interactions that took place during 
the last ten years as recent here. We acknowledge that this decision is somewhat arbitrary and 
that time lags of one, two and five years are more common in peace and conflict studies. But 
taking longer time periods reduces endogeneity concerns (water cooperation could be driven by 
informal improvements of mutual relations one or two years before such shifts are made 
official), while existing case studies on environmental peacemaking show that even time lags of 
two or five years might be too short (e.g., Abukhater 2013; Martin et al. 2011). Similarly, Barquet 
et al. (2014) finds that conservation cooperation only has an effect of interstate violence 
prevention with a time lag of ten years. 
Consequentially, our first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: A higher number of recent and positive water-related interactions make a shift towards more peaceful 
relations between two states more likely. 
 
Further, environmental peacemaking might not work if interstate relations are quite tense. In 
such a situation, positive water-related interactions are less likely to create deeper or wider 
interdependencies because cooperation remains securitised and receives little political support 
(Zikos et al. 2015). Similarly, an atmosphere of mistrust and limited interactions between 
decision makers and civil society actors restrains possibilities for building trust and 
understanding through water cooperation (Ide 2018a). We hence propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: Recent and positive water-related interactions are more likely to facilitate a shift towards more peaceful 
relations between two states if no acute conflict is going on between these states. 
 
Before the hypotheses are discussed in the light of the empirical results, the data and methods 
used for the analysis are explained.  
 
Data and methods 
Dependent variable 
The transition towards more peaceful relationships between two states is the dependent variable 
of this study. Conceiving such shifts on a continuum that includes negative as well as positive 
forms of peace is no easy task for cross-case research. Most existing datasets only include data 
on the absence of acute or militarised conflicts, or transitions towards such a state (Palmer et al. 
2015; Thompson and Dreyer 2010). 
In this study, we draw on more recent efforts by Goertz, Diehl and Balas (2016) to construct a 
peace scale which measures the peacefulness of interstate relations. The number and severity of 
‘disagreements and how they are dealt with by the participants are the key elements’ (Goertz et 
al. 2016: 28) used to position a state pair (dyad) along the peace scale in a given year. Specifically, 
Goertz and colleagues distinguish five levels of the peace scale, which are severe rivalry (0), lesser 
rivalry (0.25), negative peace (0.5), warm peace (0.75) and security community (1). In a severe 
rivalry, states disagree about several key issues and resort to intense diplomatic pressure and 
frequently also to military violence in order to enforce their claims. Security communities, by 
contrast, are characterised by few disagreements as well as strong transnational ties and 
intergovernmental organizations, while violent encounters are unthinkable. 
For each of the five stages of the peace scale, Goertz, Diehl and Balas (2016: 50-54) specify a set 
of indicators and several anchor cases (see Table 1 for an overview). They then use qualitative 
knowledge of the respective dyads, complemented by quantitative information, to classify the 
relationship between two states in a given year. Currently, peace scale data are available for all 
state-pairs with significant interactions for the period 1815-2006.  
 
[Table 1 in here] 
 
Because our hypotheses concern the improvement (rather than the absolute quality) of interstate 
relations, a shift of dyadic relations towards the positive end of the peace scale is the main 
dependent variable of this study. In order to operationalise this dependent variable for the time 
period under study (1956-2006), we use a binary dependent variable taking the value ‘1’ for years, 
in which the peace value for a given dyad increased by 0.25 points or more relative to the 
previous year (e.g. from ‘negative peace’ to ‘warm peace’ or even ‘security community’), and ‘0’ 
otherwise.1 
Using the peace scale has three particular advantages in the context of this study: First, it allows 
us to consider transitions from more (values of  0 and 0.25) towards less negative forms of peace 
(values of 0.25 and 0.5) as well as transitions towards positive forms of peace (values of 0.75 and 
1) between states. Second, comparable data are available for a large number of cases. And third, 
the peace scale identifies clearly discernible, short-term shifts (rather than long-term, gradual 
changes) towards more peaceful relations. This reduces potential endogeneity concerns because 
we can discern whether intense positive water interaction precedes such a rapid shift. 
This is not to say, however, that the peace scale data are free of weaknesses. One should keep in 
mind that this dataset is very recent, resulting in a higher risk of coding errors undetected so far. 
This is particularly important as the peace scale categorization relies heavily (though not solely) 
on the qualitative assessments of the researchers involved. Further, Kasten (2017) argues that the 
peace scale suffers from an ontological overload as it includes assumptions about the causal 
determinants of peace into its coding decisions (although these assumptions are less relevant for 
our study design). Still, in light of the advantages described above, we consider the peace scale 
 
1 Readers interested in the distribution of positive vs. negative changes in the peace scale data for dyads in 
transboundary basins 1956-2006 are referred to Table 6 in the online appendix.  
the best data source currently available to operationalise the dependent variable of this analysis. 
Summary statistics for our dependent variable and all other variables used in our analysis can be 
found in the online appendix (Table 4), along with a correlation table (Table 5).  
 
Independent variable 
In order to determine the number of positive water-related interactions (WaRI) (which are used 
as indicators for water cooperation), this study draws on the International Water Events 
Database (IWED). This dataset records freshwater-related interactions that took place between 
1946 and 2008 and orders them according to the Basins at Risk Water Event Intensity Scale 
(BAR scale) (Wolf et al. 2003). In order to construct IWED, researchers of the Oregon State 
University collected information on freshwater-related, international interactions form electronic 
news datasets and used the qualitative information provided to classify them along the BAR 
scale. This scale differentiates 15 categories of conflict and cooperation, ranging from -7 (formal 
declaration of war) to +7 (voluntary unification into one nation), with 0 referring to neutral or 
non-significant events (Yoffe and Larson 2001). 
IWED and the BAR scale are considered reliable and widely used in the literature on water 
conflict and cooperation (Link et al. 2016). As we hypothesise that positive water-related 
interactions have a peacemaking effect, we utilise the cooperative side of the BAR scale to 
operationalise the independent variable. The following water-related events are hence considered 
to be positive interactions: minor exchanges and talks (+1), official verbal support (+2), cultural 
and scientific agreements or support (+3), economic and technological support (+4), military and 
strategic support (+5), conclusion of a major treaty (+6), and voluntary unification into one 
nation (+7, did not occur in the sample) (Wolf et al. 2003). 
More specifically, we calculated the total number of positive water-related events between two 
states in the ten years preceding every dyad-year in our sample (by focussing on past events, we 
further reduce potential endogeneity). Our independent variable accounts for the fact that even 
less cooperative events according to the BAR scale, such as cultural and economic exchanges 
and support, can serve to build understanding and might indicate relevant spill-over processes 
(Ide 2017; Sadoff and Grey 2002). However, we use alternative specifications of the independent 
variable as a robustness test (see below). 
 
Control variables 
We include several control variables into the analysis to account for possible confounding effects 
First, we utilise a binary variable to control for historical shifts, or shocks in the international 
system (i.e. decolonisation, end of the Cold War). Second, we count the consecutive years a dyad has 
experienced negative peace (negative peace or higher) and also include a quadratic term in the 
regression equation to account for a curvilinear relationship between peace years and shifts in 
interstate relations – i.e. we assume both, very recent enemies and long-term friends are more 
likely to see their relations improve, as compared to other pairs of states. Third, we control for 
participation in interstate armed conflicts outside of the dyad that could provide incentives for 
rapprochement between states within the dyad. 
Fourth, following liberal theorists, we count the number of international governmental organisations 
(IGOs) both states of the dyad are common members of and include logged trade data for the last ten 
years between pairs of states (see Oneal and Russett 1999). Fifth, also following a liberal 
argumentation, we measure whether both states in a dyad are democracies, based on the polityIV 
data (Marshall et al. 2016). Finally, we account for relative military capacity, as suggested by 
realist theory (e.g., Bennett and Stam 2004; Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008). 
The rationale for including these control variables, as well as data sources and data 
transformations are discussed in greater detail in the online appendix (p. 4-5). 
 
Sample and estimation method 
Our sample includes all dyads of states within international river basins covered by the peace 
scale data, which only consider state-pairs with significant interactions during at least one point 
in time (Goertz et al. 2016). It covers the years 1956-2006. To estimate the effect of positive 
water-related interactions on the probability of an improvement of relations between states, we 
use logistic regression analysis. We cluster standard errors by dyad to account for within dyad 
similarities between observations and include time trends to control for a possible confounding 
effect of time, as the number of positive water-related interactions in our sample tends to 
increase over time.  
Moreover, we conduct additional tests to check the robustness of our findings. First, we replace 
our main independent variable with counts of positive water-related events over shorter periods 
(two, five and eight years), with a variable counting only highly-ranked events (score of three or 
higher on the BAR scale), as well as a variable summing BAR scores over a ten-year period to 
give highly negative and positive events more weight in the analysis. Second, we test for a 
possible rare event bias, as recommended by King and Zeng (2001), because our dataset only 
contains a very small proportion of dyad years with positive changes in inter-state relations (1% 
of our sample). Third, we use dyad-random effects to control for unobserved time-invariant 
dyad-specific characteristics that might have a bearing on water cooperation and interstate 
relations.      
 
Results 
Table 2 shows the results of the main analysis. First we test for the effect of our control variables 
alone (Model 1). The model yields an area under the curve (AUC) estimate of roughly 0.74, 
indicating that it fits the peace scale data fairly well. Most of the coefficients are significant and 
have the expected sign. In particular, the likelihood of an improvement in the relations between 
contiguous states seems to increase with the number of international organisations both states in 
the dyad are common members of, the involvement of at least one state in an interstate armed 
conflict, with both states in the dyad being democracies, during system-level shocks, as well as 
with time, although the coefficient for the latter is only significant at the 10% level. Consistent 
with our expectations, the effect of peace years follows a u-shaped pattern as indicated by a 
negative coefficient for peace years and a positive coefficient for peace years squared. We also 
observe a negative coefficient for relative military capabilities, but it is not statistically significant.  
 
[Table 2 in here] 
 
We now turn to testing our main hypotheses in Models 2-4. In line with our first hypothesis we 
see a positive effect of the number of positive water-related interactions in the previous 10 years 
on the likelihood of a rapprochement between states (positive coefficient in Model 2 with a p-
value smaller than 0.051). This effect is robust when replacing membership in international 
organisations with the volume of intra-dyad trade over the last 10 years, to a rare-event 
correction, as well as when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between dyads in a dyad-
random-effects-model. On the other hand, effects for alternative specifications of the 
independent variable are not significant. That is, restricting the analysis to more recent and more 
intensive cooperative events actually yields weaker results (see Table 3). Overall, hypothesis 1 
thus receives support when observing longer time periods and including low- as well as high 
intensity cooperative events. 
To test our second hypothesis, we divide our sample in dyads-years characterised by rather 
peaceful (Model 3: peace scale values 0.5, 0.75 and 1) or confrontative (Model 4: peace scale 
values 0 and 0.25) relations. In general, we observe that the average likelihood of a shift towards 
more peaceful relations is lower in the peaceful, and higher in the confrontative sample, as 
indicated by the coefficient for the constant in Model 3 and 4. Yet, we also see that the effect of 
positive water-related events is much larger in the peaceful sample than in the overall sample, 
which is consistent with hypothesis 2. On the other hand, we do not see a statistically significant 
effect of positive water-related interactions in the confrontative sample. 
 
[Table 3 in here] 
 
To describe our results in substantive terms, we estimate incremental changes in the probability 
of a positive shift in interstate relations as a function of the number of positive water-related 
events between these states in the last ten years, with all other variables held constant at their 
mean. We then compare the results with the estimated effect of total trade between these states 
over the same period. To ensure comparability, we use the coefficients from Model 10 for both 
estimations. The results are shown in Figure 1. We estimate for instance that, all else equal, the 
effect of a shift from 1 to 4 positive water-related events is roughly comparable to the effect of a 
change from 12 to 40 billion $US in trade volume (i.e. an increase in the probability of a positive 
shift in interstate relations of roughly 12.5%).    
 
 [Figure 1 in here] 
 
Figure 1: Estimated changes in the probability of a positive shift in interstate relations as 
a function of the number of positive water-related interactions in the last ten years (left) 
and overall trade between states in the last ten years (right). Shaded areas delimit 95% 
confidence bands. Superimposed bars represent the distribution of observations.  
 
We conclude that the number of positive water-related interactions within a dyad increases the 
probability of this dyad moving towards the positive end of the peace scale. This effect seems to 
apply in particular to dyads with rather harmonious relations, thus supporting our argument that 
environmental peacemaking is most likely to take place in settings characterised by the absence 
of intense hostilities. 
 
Discussion 
The results of our study provide support for the environmental peacemaking approach: A higher 
number of positive, water-related interactions during the previous ten years makes a shift 
towards more peaceful relations between two states more likely, at least if the states are not in 
acute conflict with each other. 
A cursory view on the qualitative literature suggests that this relationship is not a statistical 
artefact, but underpinned by observable mechanisms. The informal ‘picnic table talks’ on water 
between decision makers from Israel and Jordan served as one means to build trust and working 
relations between both sides, which facilitated the peace talks in the 1990s. During the initial 
stages of these talks, diplomats also turned to positive-sum topics like water cooperation several 
times in order to move the negotiations forward when a stalemate occurred (Abukhater 2013; 
Haddadin 2011). Similarly, the negotiation and conclusion (in 1996) of the Mahakali Treaty 
paved the way for further water cooperation between India and Nepal and set a positive 
atmosphere for the upcoming (and eventually successful) negotiations about the renewal of the 
bilateral trade agreement (Swain 2002). High-level water-related interactions also served as trust 
building tools during the reconciliation process between El Salvador and Honduras from 1986 to 
1992 (López 2004). 
Taken together, the qualitative evidence seems to suggest that building trust and setting positive 
symbols (highlighted by constructivist theories) is more relevant as an environmental 
peacemaking mechanism than a spill-over of cooperation (emphasised by liberal approaches) (see 
also Ide 2018b), although more research on the issue is needed. Insights from these and other 
case studies also strengthen the arguments that the relevant correlations are not driven by reverse 
causality: Positive water-related interactions are not (merely) expressions of a very early stage of a 
peacemaking process, but can actively catalyse a shift towards more peaceful international 
relations. 
This effect is particularly pronounced in the sample of dyads that are already characterised by 
negative or warm peace and absent for dyads with more tense relations. This finding is in line 
with a recent cross-case study claiming that already ongoing reconciliation processes are 
necessary for successful environmental peacemaking (Ide 2018a), but also with qualitative 
evidence. When analysing cross-border water cooperation in Cyprus, Zikos et al. (2015) show 
that in situations of intense hostility, scepticism towards environment-related interactions 
prevails, frequently leading to public resistance against and state repression of cross-border 
cooperation. Further, even if considerable water-related cooperation takes places, for instance 
between India and Pakistan on the Indus River, its effect on the overall situation is rather limited 
if conflict is far more prevalent than cooperation in other domains (Swain 2002). 
Previous qualitative and quantitative studies also suggest that if environmental cooperation 
contributes to environmental peacemaking, it is usually not the most important factor, but rather 
combines with and reinforces other processes such as political negotiations, external mediation 
and economic coordination (Ide 2018b). In line with this, the inclusion of WaRI does hardly 
improve the model fit (Table 2), hence indicating that water-related cooperation is not the most 
important predictor of shifts towards more peaceful relations.. 
These results speak to the wider literature in at least two broad ways. First, scholars of 
international relations and international water politics have for a long time conceived 
environmental cooperation as a dependent variable whose occurrence (Giordano et al. 2014; 
Young 2016) and effectiveness (Garrick and De Stefano 2016; Mitchell and Zawahri 2015) has to 
be explained. Conversely, scholars of rivalry termination and international peacemaking have so 
far hardly paid attention to environmental issues in general and to water cooperation in particular 
as relevant explanatory factors (e.g., Goertz et al. 2016; Kupchan 2010; Rasler et al. 2013). The 
findings of our study highlight that environmental and especially water cooperation can also be 
conceived of as independent variables which potentially have a transformative effect on 
international politics by catalysing shifts towards more peaceful relations.  
Second, a large literature has discussed the question of whether renewable resource scarcity and 
climate change are potential causes of violent conflict, with water being a key component of 
these debates (Sakaguchi et al. 2017; Seter et al. 2018). But our results indicate that 
environmental cooperation in the form of positive water-related interactions also offers 
opportunities for forging closer ties between states, hence supporting calls in the environmental 
security literature to focus stronger on cases of peaceful adaptation to environmental stress 
(Adams et al. 2018). 
This said, several uncertainties and puzzles remain.  
Just like Barquet et al. (2014), we find that environmental peacemaking is a long-term process 
that needs a decade or more to show results. In contrast to a time lag of ten years, the number of 
WaRIs in the previous two, five and eight years is still positively, but no longer significantly 
correlated with shifts towards more peaceful relations in our analysis (Table 3). But another 
cross-case study on environmental cooperation and international reconciliation yields the most 
significant results when using a time lag of five years (Ide 2018a). Several case studies, for 
example on Israeli-Jordanian water negotiations in the 1990s (Haddadin 2011) and the Mahakali 
Treaty between India and Nepal (Swain 2002), also provide some support for a more short-term 
effect of environmental cooperation as well. These disparate findings reveal that the temporal 
dimensions of (water-related) environmental peacemaking are not well understood yet. 
There are also some potential issues with the datasets we used. The peace scale data, for instance, 
is pretty new and coding errors might not yet have been detected. This is especially relevant 
when it comes to secret or informal agreements, which already indicate an improvement of 
mutual relations months or years before official declarations are made. If the improvements of 
relations in a dyad started earlier than indicated by the peace scale data, this could raise 
endogeneity concerns because some of the WaRI would have taken place after relations already 
(slightly) improved. However, we believe that using a time lag of one to ten years provides a 
safeguard against such problems.  
Further, the data on water-related interactions could be biased as the underlying databases tend 
to underreport events for countries which are peripheral or where English is not an official 
language. This is especially the case for minor cooperative events. We cannot tell whether and 
how such a bias affects our results. Also, IWED does hardly contain data on secret water 
negotiations, but researchers have argued that such negotiations can be crucial for building trust 
between both sides, as exemplified by the secret ‘picnic table talks’ between Israel and Jordan 
(Abukhater 2013).  
 
Conclusion 
This study provides one of the first empirical, cross-case tests of the environmental peacemaking 
approach. Specifically, we analyse whether positive, water-related interactions in the previous ten 
years make a shift towards more peaceful relations between two states more likely. Our results 
suggest that such water cooperation indeed has a positive and significant effect on the 
improvement of interstate relations. This is particularly the case for dyads which are free of acute 
conflicts and a least characterised by negative peace. 62% of the dyad-years in our sample belong 
to the latter category, including several cases which feature considerable tensions, such as 
Armenia-Turkey (1992-2006), Egypt-Israel (1990-2006) and Qatar-Saudi Arabia (1972-2006). 
Our findings are highly relevant as they suggest that policy makers, donors and civil society 
activists could address concerns related to environmental degradation and peace and security 
simultaneously by facilitating international water cooperation (Conca 2002). 
Our study suggests several promising pathways for future research. To start with, it is worth for 
environmental security scholars to focus not only on instances of conflict and violence, but also 
of cooperation and peacebuilding in the face of environmental stress. This is particularly the case 
for the intrastate level, which is not in the focus of this article, but on which environmental and 
climate security scholars have built considerable expertise (Seter et al. 2018). 
Further, research on international relations and environmental politics should pay more attention 
to environmental cooperation as an independent variable rather than as a (desired) outcome to 
be explained. This would allow for fruitful cooperation between environmental politics research 
and peace studies to enhance knowledge on environmental peacemaking (which is a very young 
research field). Scholars have gone a long way, for instance, in figuring out how water 
cooperation might be achieved and how water conflict can be avoided (e.g., Ovodenko 2014; 
Petersen-Perlman et al. 2017; Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008). As demonstrated by our study, 
drawing on this expertise and data strongly benefits research on the impact of water cooperation 
on wider international relations. 
When conceiving environmental cooperation as an independent variable, there are several 
options to move research on international environmental peacemaking forward. An improved 
peace scale with more than five categories would allow for a more nuanced analysis, but one can 
also draw on other indicators of more peaceful relations, such as reconciliation (Rasler et al. 
2013), the absence of militarised disputes (Barquet et al. 2014), and closer economic ties (Barbieri 
et al. 2009). 
An improvement of international relations can also be facilitated by cooperation on other 
environmental issues, such as conservation and renewable energies. Cooperation on and 
peacemaking linked to these topics might follow different trajectories, for instance because water 
(just like energy) issues are often more closely tied to strong political and economic interests than 
conservation concerns (Weinthal 2004). We hence encourage the development of environment-
related interaction datasets similar to IWED, for instance by extracting information from the 
Global Database on Events, Language and Tone (GDELT 2018). Researchers could also utilise 
data on transboundary conservation areas (Barquet et al. 2014) and international environmental 
agreements (Ovodenko 2016) Coding existing agreements for institutionalised cooperation 
provisions (such as joint management boards) would allow more nuanced analyses of the impact 
of (various form of) environmental cooperation on interstate relations. 
Finally, the causal mechanisms connecting environmental cooperation to peacemaking and 
especially the time scales on which they operate are not fully understood yet (see discussion 
section) and deserve further attention by both quantitative and qualitative studies. Conducting 
research along these lines would allow for fruitful interdisciplinary cooperation and further the 
capability of environmental peacemaking research to provide policy-relevant insights. 
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Table 1: Summary of the peace scale (adapted from Goertz et al. 2016: 25-46) 
 







- many disagreements 
- key issues unresolved 
- frequent military encounters 
- preparation for future wars 










- several disagreements 
- key issues unresolved 
- isolated military encounters 
- preparation for future wars 















- some disagreements 
- key issues are mitigated or 
resolved 
- no military encounters 
- preparation for future conflicts 














- few disagreements 
- key issues resolved 
- no military encounters 
- transnational ties 












- few disagreements 
- key issues resolved 
- joint military planning 
- transnational ties 






Table 2: Logistic regression analysis 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Log. nbr. pos. WaRI (10 years)  0.0899 (0.0461) + 0.3237 (0.0723) ** -0.0763 (0.0666) 
Number of IGOs t-1 0.0002(0.000) ** 0.0002(0.000) ** 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0004 (0.0002) * 
Democracies 0.0153 (0.0053) ** 0.0156 (0.0054) ** 0.0374 (0.0052) ** -0.0237 (0.0101) * 
Interstate conflict 0.6592 (0.2842) * 0.6270 (0.2916) * -14.7225 (0.3419) ** 0.3520 (0.2821) 
Peace years -0.0377 (0.0076) ** -0.0369 (0.0076) ** -0.0096 (0.0097) -0.0371 (0.0183) * 
Peace years sq. 1.072 (0.1702) ** 1.0622 (0.17) ** 3.0559 (0.4824) ** 0.6405 (0.2771) * 
Rel. military capacities -0.0001(0.000) 0.0000 (0.000) 0.0014 (0.0004) ** 0.0001 (0.0024) 
Systemic shock 1.1293 (0.1775) ** 1.1634 (0.1817) ** 2.3621 (0.257) ** 0.4354 (0.2301) + 
Time trend 0.0108 (0.0059) + 0.0090 (0.0059) -0.0060 (0.0079) 0.0615 (0.0118) ** 
Constant -5.5180 (0.2902) ** -5.3869 (0.2864) ** -8.8819 (0.5212) ** -5.0292 (0.4556) ** 
     
Number of observations 14981 14981 12099 2882 
Log likelihood -948.21 -945.97 -309.97 -468.5 
AUC 0.74 0.74 0.92 0.69 
 
 




Table 3: Robustness checks 
 
Variable (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Log. nbr. pos. WaRI (10 
years)      0.1026 (0.0496) * 0.0910 (0.0419) * 0.0899 (0.0419) * 
Log. nbr. pos. WaRI (2 
years) 0.0853 (0.061)        
Log. nbr. pos. WaRI (5 
years)  0.0609 (0.052)       
Log. nbr. pos. WaRI (8 
years)   0.0447 (0.0495)      
Log. nbr. high. pos. WaRI 
(10 years)    0.0780 (0.0514)     
Log. sum WaRI scores 
(10 years)     0.0362 (0.0235)    
Number of IGOs t-1 0.0002 (0.0000) ** 0.0002 (0.0000) ** 0.0002 (0.0000) ** 0.0002 (0.0000) ** 0.0002 (0.0000) ** 0.0002 (0.0000) ** 0.0002 (0.0000) ** 0.0002 (0.0000) ** 
Log. trade (10 years)      0.1128 (0.0356) **   
Democracies 0.0155 (0.0053) ** 0.0155 (0.0053) ** 0.0155 (0.0053) ** 0.0155 (0.0054) ** 0.0156 (0.0054) **  0.0162 (0.0052) ** 0.0156 (0.0052) ** 
Interstate conflict 0.6267 (0.2921) * 0.6371 (0.2897) * 0.6446 (0.2883) * 0.6451 (0.2889) * 0.6418 (0.288) * 0.1305 (0.4126) 0.6494 (0.2883) * 0.6270 (0.2883) * 
Peace years -0.0371 (0.0076) ** -0.0371 (0.0076) ** -0.0373 (0.0076) ** -0.0375  (0.0076) ** -0.0373 (0.0076) ** -0.0401 (0.0081) ** -0.0375 (0.0068) ** -0.0369 (0.0069) ** 
Peace years sq. 1.0685 (0.1693) ** 1.0699 (0.1694) ** 1.0682 (0.1703) ** 1.0619 (0.1708) ** 1.0613 (0.1705) ** 0.9826 (0.2055) ** 1.0546 (0.1763) ** 1.0622 (0.1763) ** 
Rel. military capacities -0.0001(0.0006) -0.0001(0.0006) -0.0001(0.0006) 0.0000 (0.0006) 0.0000 (0.0006) -0.0010 (0.0013) 0.0008 (0.0009) 0.0000 (0.0009) 
Systemic shock 1.1242 (0.1781) ** 1.1368 (0.1792) ** 1.1417 (0.1794) ** 1.1583 (0.181) ** 1.1598 (0.1814) ** 0.9903 (0.2257) ** 1.1692 (0.1781) ** 1.1634 (0.1781) ** 
Time trend 0.0098 (0.0059) . 0.0099 (0.0059) . 0.0100 (0.0059) . 0.0101 (0.0058) . 0.0097 (0.0059) . 0.0131 (0.0079) . 0.0086 (0.0065) 0.0090 (0.0065) 
Constant -5.3382 (0.2975) ** -5.4112 (0.2928) ** -5.4464 (0.2899) ** -5.3989 (0.2856) ** -5.4205 (0.2855) ** -5.4191 (0.4239) ** -5.3754 (0.3095) ** -5.3869 (0.3096) ** 
         
Number of observations 14981 14981 14981 14981 14981 10605 14981 14981 
Log likelihood -947.22 -947.42 -947.71 -947.03 -946.93 -633.18  -945.97 
AUC 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.74 
Rare event correction - - - - - - yes - 
Random effects - - - - - - - Yes 
 
 
DV= Probability of shift towards more peaceful interstate relations. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Significance codes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + P<0.10  
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